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5 DETERMINANTS OF PORTS OF ENTRY AND EXIT 
 A Panel Data Analysis on the Relationship between 
 Firm Characteristics, Financial Performance, and 
 Internal Labor Markets75 
 
 
Personnel economists have become increasingly engaged in the empirical analysis of 
internal labor markets. Mostly based on single-firm analyses, evidence for the existence of 
specific stylized facts has been gathered, such as the presence of ports of entry and exit. 
However, the impact of firm-specific characteristics on the use of internal labor markets in 
general and ports of entry and exit in particular has not yet been analyzed, with the 
exception of the literature on CEO-turnover. Previous studies on CEO-turnover found that 
firm characteristics such as general and financial performance influence CEO turnover 
decisions. Using a Danish employer-employee linked database, this study empirically 
investigates the relationship between firm size, firm growth, industry, and profitability, on 
one side, and ports of entry and exit, on the other. We show that these factors strongly 
influence the use of ports of entry and exit. Firm heterogeneity should therefore be 




How idiosyncratic are the ‘stylized facts’ of internal labor markets (ILMs)? This question is 
relevant for economists who have become increasingly interested in what goes on inside 
organizations. Since the seminal articles by Lazear (1992) and BGH (1994a & 1994b) 
additional empirical studies have been performed such as Treble et al. (2001) and Kwon 
(2006). These investigations of ILMs have typically taken a single-firm approach.  
The potential for generalization of the results is still an open question that can only be 
answered empirically by means of a multiple-firm approach. This study attempts to provide 
an answer to that question. It is an empirical study and explorative by nature, which implies 
that no explicit hypotheses will be tested, but rather the focus will be on an extensive 
investigation of ILMs on a multi-firm level. 
One of the main properties of an ILM is that workers are hired at ports of entry, while other 
job openings are mainly filled from within (Lazear and Oyer, 2004). In this chapter we focus 
on the usage of ports of entry and exit and take a multiple-firm approach to investigate how 
external conditions influence their presence. By doing so, this study resembles the 
literature on CEO-turnover, which has a long history of analyzing entry and exit of 
managers using multi-firm data. The literature on CEO-turnover stresses the importance of 
firm characteristics on hiring and separation decisions. Recent studies in personnel 
economics (e.g. Eriksson and Werwatz, 2003) have also emphasized the importance of 
                                                          
75 This chapter is based on Van Herpen, Cools, Eriksson and Van Praag (2005), which was presented at a seminar 
in Aarhus. I would like to thank Niels Westergård-Nielsen for helpful comments. The research was supported by 
means of a European Community Marie Curie Fellowship. (For more information: http://www.cordis.lu/improving). 
Disclaimer: the author is solely responsible for the information communicated, and the European Commission is not 
responsible for any view or results expressed. 
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different firm-specific factors, such as the industry and the type of staff. Based on the CEO-
turnover literature we distinguish firm-specific variables, such as the size of the firm, the 
growth rate of the firm, the industry in which it operates, and firm performance variables to 
investigate how ports of entry and exit are systematically influenced by the characteristics 
of the firm. We analyze the effects of these dimensions on the entry and exit of lower-level 
employees, middle-management and top-management, and include CEO-turnover in the 
analysis as a benchmark. The data source is an employer-employee linked Danish panel 
data set.  
In the next section we will first expound the theory of ILM and provide a survey of the 
empirical literature. Section 5.3 will discuss the data used, including a brief discussion of 
the relevant characteristics of the Danish labor market. Section 5.4 will discuss the results, 
and Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Determinants of ILM 
 
5.2.1 The theoretical concept of internal labor markets 
ILM is a concept that has aroused interest from both economists and sociologists (Kwon 
and Meyersson Milgrom, 2003) and is a cornerstone of personnel economics (see Section 
1.1). Personnel economists define ILMs as “sets of careers and relatively detailed defined 
career paths that in turn lead to long-term attachments” (Eriksson and Werwatz, 2003).  
An important decision in organizations is whether to hire an insider or an outsider for a job 
opening. A stylized fact of an ILM is that workers are hired primarily from outside at specific 
ports of entry (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Different theoretical explanations have been 
developed that might explain this decision and a growing collection of empirical work has 
used the concept (Lazear and Oyer, 2004).  
One theory motivating ILMs views internal job flows as an incentive instrument. In the 
tournament model (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), the wage level and other non-pecuniary 
rewards that come with the jobs of highly-ranked employees serve as an incentive for all 
lower-ranked workers within the organization. The (theoretical) ultimate reward in the 
tournament model is the chance of becoming CEO.76  
A second rationale for ILMs is explained by human capital theory (Becker, 1962).  
The existence of firm-specific human capital, i.e. human capital that is only valued by the 
current employer, produces rents. Employers and employees are only willing to invest in 
firm-specific training, if they will be able to extract a large enough portion of the rent.  
Firm-specific human capital makes employees less likely to switch to another firm, since 
                                                          
76 Tournament theory was discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.2, while empirical results are presented in Section 
2.2.4.3. The incentive effect of promotions was also supported empirically in Chapter 4.  
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turnover will lead to the loss of this human capital.77 Therefore, these workers will have a 
basic incentive to follow a career inside an organization.78 
 
5.2.2 Potential determinants of inter-firm variation in stylized facts of ILMs 
Section 2.4 – theoretical background – presented existing empirical research that explores 
ILMs (see Table 2.4). In this section we will discuss potential determinants for the variation 
of internal mobility that have been established in previous studies. First, we will review a 
stream of literature that typically uses a multi-firm approach for analyzing the effect of 
external conditions on a specific port of entry and exit: the CEO-turnover literature.  
5.2.2.1 Determinants from the CEO-turnover literature 
The CEO-turnover literature focuses on the circumstances in which top executives leave a 
company (e.g. Denis and Denis, 1995; Cools and Van Praag, 2003), evidently using a 
multi-firm approach. We can extract lessons from this literature that can be used to 
distinguish potential determinants that influence turnover decisions. The determinant that is 
studied most is financial firm performance prior to the CEO-turnover, in particular stock 
returns and accounting profits. The expected inverse relationship between pre-event stock 
returns and CEO-turnover has been found in numerous studies (e.g. Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988), suggesting that internal or external disciplining 
mechanisms affect the turnover of CEOs.79 Establishing the expected relationship between 
accounting profits and CEO-turnover has encountered more obstacles and has been 
subjected to a meta-analysis, which shows ambiguous results (Dalton et al., 1998).80  
In addition to performance variables, CEO-turnover is related to two other types of 
variables: CEO-specific variables (e.g. age, gender or education) and other firm-specific 
variables (e.g. industry, size) (Lausten, 2002). Especially firm-specific variables are likely to 
contribute to our understanding of ILMs.  
The succession of the CEO, by an insider or an outsider, and firm performance in the 
period after CEO-turnover have also been studied. Empirical evidence indicates that the 
decision to hire an outside successor depends on firm performance: companies in distress 
are more likely to rely on outside hiring. Outsider succession has been shown to have a 
significantly positive effect on post-turnover performance (Huson et al., 2004).  
One potential reason is the organizational change that outside managers can bring about, 
                                                          
77 Lazear (2003) argues that all human capital of an employee can be general human capital, but that the 
combination in which the employee possesses the different types of human capital is specific. Conceptually, this 
leads to the same conclusion: the human capital an employee holds in total fits best with one specific firm and the 
degree to which an employee can use it outside the current firm differs. Evidence of the theoretical concept ‘firm-
specific human capital’ has been found in several empirical studies (e.g. Farber 1999; Neal 1995; Bingley and 
Westergård-Nielsen 2003). 
78 Human capital theory is discussed in Section 2.3.1. Also the extensions of human capital theory such as the task 
assignment model can be used as a rationale for the ILM. 
79 Other factors can also influence the decision for CEO dismissal. For instance, Fredrickson et al. (1988) stress the 
importance of mediating factors such as the board of directors’ expectations and attributions, the board’s allegiances 
and values, the availability of alternative candidates for CEO, and the power of the incumbent CEO. 
80 An important distinction, often hard to make and thereby possibly leading to the ambiguity of the results, is the 
distinction between forced and unforced turnover. For example, when it is not possible to distinguish between forced 
and unforced turnover, age has a highly significant effect on expected turnover, especially around retirement age 
(e.g. Barro and Barro, 1990; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985). Warner et al. (1988), Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson 
et al. (2004), who were able to make such a distinction, found a strong relationship between financial distress and 
forced turnover. 
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whereas insiders are committed to old strategies and historic decisions (Boeker and 
Goodstein, 1993). Evidently, the determinants of outside versus inside hiring might also be 
relevant at lower hierarchical levels. 
The management literature on CEO turnover is extensive and has investigated many 
aspects, such as the likelihood of intra-firm, intra-industry and outside-industry succession 
(Zhang and Rajagopalon, 2003). This literature has for example noted both the positive 
effects of external hiring of CEO’s (e.g. the possibility to initiate change) as well as the 
potential negative effects (e.g. the lack of firm-specific knowledge, the risk of disrupting 
firms and the difficulties for the new CEO to find support at senior management level) 
(Zhang and Rajagopalon, 2004). This literature is quite extensive and we will not try to add 
to this theory. Rather, we will borrow from this literature and apply the results to personnel 
economics (i.e. hiring and firing at lower hierarchical organizational levels). 
5.2.2.2 Determinants from personnel economics 
The CEO-turnover literature has shown the importance of using firm performance and has 
also indicated the usefulness of other firm-specific variables. We wish to distinguish three 
firm-specific variables (in addition to firm-performance) that have been relevant in previous 
studies of personnel economics: industry, size, and growth rate. With respect to ‘industry’, 
Eriksson and Werwatz (2003) have established that internal job movements are more 
dominant in utilities and financial services. With respect to company size, it is likely that 
smaller companies will depend less on internal mobility: in order to offer internal job-
movements, the size of a company has to be sufficient since a small firm will have difficulty 
in offering employees adequate career paths. Gibbs et al. (2003) have provided empirical 
evidence that larger firms are more effective in organizing occupational and hierarchical 
changes. Besides organizational size, the number of job openings will depend on the 
percentage turnover and organizational growth. In order for a position to become available, 
either the person previously holding that position has to leave (by being promoted, 
demoted, or leaving the company), or a new slot has to be created. A growing firm (in 
terms of employees) will create new positions at virtually all hierarchical levels. Thus, 
organizational growth can improve internal mobility (Baker, 1990). Dohmen et al. (2004) 
have empirically shown that promotion rates increase in periods of corporate growth and 
fall in periods of decline. 
 
5.2.3 Cross-case variation in ports of entry and exit: potential determinants 
The previous discussion has put forth four potential determinants: firm performance, firm 
size, firm growth, and industry. In Section 2.4 different stylized facts of ILMs were 
discussed. A large amount of cross-case variation in ports of entry and exit was 
established, which is one of the main characteristics of an ILM (see Section 1.1 and 
Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Table 5.1 presents an outline of ten empirical studies on this 
topic and which are a selection from Table 2.4. 
   
Table 5.1: Empirical investigations of ILMs: Single-firm analysis 
Author(s) Do Specific Ports 
of Entry (and Exit) 
exist? 
Country Years Level (white/ 
blue collar) 







Lazear (1992) U Not available 1978 to 1989 Excludes higher-
level managers  
Not available Unknown (roughly 
100,000 employees 
worked in the firm over 
the 13-year period) 
Not available. Not available 
BGH (1994a & 
1994b) 
U U.S. 1969 to 1988 Managerial Financial 
Services 
1,380 6,022 8% ROA = 0% to 
1% with one 
negative year 
(1987) 
Ariga et al. (1999) U Japan 1971 to 1994 White-collar and 
engineers 




stable over the 
past 10 years 
Not available 
Seltzer and Merrett 
(2000) 
W Australia 1887 to 1899 White-collar 
workers (entire 
careers) 
Bank 448 798 5% No information 
Hamilton and 
MacKinnon (2001) 
A Canada 1921 to 1944 All Railway n.a.  -1% Difficulties in the 
1930s 
Howlett (2001) W U.K. 1870 to 1913 Blue-collar Railway ~20,000 
mid 1880s 
~25,000 1% Not available 
Treble et al. (2001) U U.K. 1989 to 1997 All Financial 
Services 
~45,000 ~38,000 -2% Not available 
Lin (2005) W Taiwan 1991 to 2000 All Automotive ~300 ~850 12% Positive in all 
years, but 
decline between 
1993 and 1998  
Dohmen et al. 
(2004) 
A Holland 1987 to 1996 All Aerospace  10,275 7,141 -4% Filed for 
bankruptcy in 
1996 





3,373 (not specified over 
years) 
 
Not available Not available 
Legend of results:  W: Evidence of stylized fact is (most likely) present 
  U: Some evidence in support of stylized fact has been found  
  A: Evidence in support of stylized fact is (completely) absent 
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The table shows that not all studies have established the use of specific ports of entry and 
exit.81 We want to get some idea as to whether the industry, the size, the growth rate, and 
the firm performance can have influenced the results. It is noteworthy that five case studies 
were conducted within the financial service industry (i.e. banking or insurance) (BGH, 
1994a &1994b; Seltzer and Merrett, 2000; Treble et al., 2001; Kwon, 2006) and relied 
mostly on analyses of white-collar workers. These studies did find evidence of specific 
ports of entry, consistent with previous studies that have identified financial services as an 
industry with a predominance of ILMs (Eriksson and Werwatz, 2003). The two case studies 
that found no or only very limited proof (Dohmen et al., 2004; Hamilton and MacKinnon, 
2001) were in the railway and aerospace industry and both experienced financial distress 
as well as negative growth (in terms of employees). Two different case studies, which both 
used data from relatively small companies (Seltzer and Merrett, 2000; Lin, 2005), found 
support for ports of entry, but both companies also had a relatively high growth rate.  
Thus, although there is some indication that the potential determinants do indeed influence 
the ports of entry, more general conclusions can only be drawn based on multi-firm 
analyses.  
 
5.3  Data and Methodology 
 
5.3.1 Characteristics of the Danish labor market  
Since we use Danish data we first briefly discuss the main characteristics of the Danish 
corporate sector. Denmark is a country with a large number of mostly small, privately-
owned companies. This stands in contrast with other countries, for example the U.S., 
where many large publicly-traded companies exist. This might be important, since the size 
of the company potentially influences the existence of ports of entry and exit. Also, the 
ownership structure can have a relationship with (parts of) the ILM. For example, in a 
privately-owned company, where the owner is also the CEO, poor performance is not likely 
to lead to CEO-turnover.82  
Another important characteristic of the Danish labor market concerns the legal rules 
regarding dismissals and unemployment. Scandinavian countries are typically described as 
being welfare states in which the rights of employees are considered to be of paramount 
importance. In general, this also holds for Denmark, but there are some important 
exceptions. Employees can be laid off on the spot or with short notice, varying between a 
minimum length of 0 and a maximum of 6 months (depending on the occupation, the 
contract type and tenure of the employees). The flip side of this system is a generous 
unemployment system that provides unemployment benefits with hardly any waiting time, 
with a maximum compensation rate of 90 percent of the previous job and an upper limit for 
high incomes such that for high incomes the effective percentage will be lower than 90 
percent. Pension systems and sickness benefits are portable and not dependent of the 
employer. These rules and regulations result in a turnover rate that is comparable with that 
                                                          
81 The studies mainly deal with ports of entry. Therefore, we will discuss the differences and similarities concerning 
ports of entry and not refer to ports of exit. 
82 With respect to public companies, Lausten (2002) describes the two-tier Danish corporate governance system with 
a board of executive directors and a separate supervisory board. The supervisory board appoints the executive 
board members, including the CEO, and is supposed to act as a control mechanism that should ensure a 
shareholder orientation (Rose and Mejer, 2003).  
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of the U.S., and the average tenure is thus remarkably similar: 7.9 years in Denmark 
versus 7.4 years in the U.S. (OECD, 1997) and lower than in Sweden and Finland (10.5).83 
All together, Denmark combines the welfare system of the Scandinavian countries with the 
‘hiring and firing’ rules of the United States. 
 
5.3.2 Data, variables and methodology 
The data used in this study is a subset of the Integrated Database (IDA) for Labor Market 
Research constructed for the Danish Center for Corporate Performance, CCP.  
This database contains data for all Danish residents in the period 1980-2000 and is 
maintained by Statistics Denmark and CCP. Workplaces and individuals can both be 
tracked over time with an identification code, while individuals are linked to workplaces in 
the November of each year. This enables analyses at both the individual and the 
organizational level. At the individual level, the data set contains information on, for 
example, age, education, gender, tenure, wage level, and the occupational code (ISCO). 
The ISCO code identifies job classes of individual employees. At the firm level, the data set 
contains information on the firm’s industry group and its financial performance.  
No information is available on private or public ownership of the company. 
We identify ports of entry and exit in three steps. A first step is to distinguish levels within 
the organization, in order to identify where employees enter and leave the organization. 
The four-digit ISCO code is used to identify the CEO and to distinguish between the top- 
management level, the middle-management/professionals84 (e.g. white-collar workers) and 
the lower-level employees.85 
After identifying the job levels, the second step is to identify ports of entry and exit. The 
number of people entering (leaving) an organization at a certain job level has to be related 
to the total number of people entering (leaving). We define the relative turnover at level X 
in year t as:  
 





year tin company   theleaving employees of # Total
year tin  X level fromcompany   theleaving employees of # 
 (5.1) 
                                                          
83 See also Figure 6.1. 
84 We will use these two terms interchangeably. 
85 To identify the CEO we mostly relied on the 1210 code, normally reserved for the Chief Executive Officers. Since 
this position was not always filled, or sometimes filled by more than one person at the same time, we also used 122- 
(production and operations managers), 123- (other specialist managers) and 13--(managers of small enterprises) to 
ensure we had a sample of the top-managers. A combination of these codes and the wage-level (the highest wage of 
the organization) was used to identify the CEO. However, for some cases, identifying the CEO was still complicated. 
If this was the case, we dropped the company in order to ensure the data set contains companies where the factual 
CEO was identified. We were unable to manually search for the CEO in public sources, since both the company and 
the individuals are anonymous. All other employees with the codes described are labeled “top-management”. 
Employees with an ISCO code between 2000 and 3000 are classified as middle-management (professional white-
collar workers). Employees in the remaining ISCO codes are labeled as lower-level employees. The ISCO codes are 
absolute, implying that a firm can consist of mainly white-collar workers, while other firms have mainly blue-collar 
workers.  
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and relative inflow as:  
 





year tin company   theentering employees of # Total
year tin  X levelat company   theentering employees of #
.   (5.2) 
 
The third step will be to distinguish ports of entry and exit within levels. We will use the 
relative wages of employees within their level to determine the position within a level at 
which an employee enters or exits the organization. The definition of this measure is the 
median wage of the employees leaving (entering) relative to the incumbents’ median wage 
at the same level:86 
 






year tin  X level incumbents eMedian wag
year tin  X levelcompany   theleaving employees eMedian waglog ,  (5.3) 
and 
 





year tin  X level incumbents eMedian wag
year tin  X levelcompany   theentering employees eMedian waglog .  (5.4) 
 
The variables defined by Equations 5.1 to 5.4 serve as the dependent variables of our 
analyses. 
The independent variables consist of two groups. The first group contains the potential 
determinants of ports of entry and exit that we discussed previously: namely, the 
profitability level of the company, the size of the company, the growth rate of the company, 
and the industry in which the company operates. As a performance or profitability indicator 
we will use Return On Assets (ROA) defined as: 
 
                                                          
86 We use the logarithm since we do not wish to exclude exceptionally high or low wage differentials, but rather take 
them into account in proportion.  
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 ,  (5.5) 
 
in which operating assets equals the sum of fixed assets, inventory, work in progress and 
trade and other debtors minus the trade creditors. The logarithm of the total number of 
employees is used as the size variable, while the change in the number of employees 
measures the growth rate of the organization.87 Furthermore, industry dummies are 
created using the industry code provided by IDA.88  
The second group of independent variables consists of control variables. We control for the 
average age, education, and gender of the employees within the organization. The 
inclusion of these variables can be compared with the CEO-specific control variables used 
in the CEO turnover literature. We also include the relative size of a level (number of 
workers in a level divided by the total number of employees in the organization) in the 
regression models, where the relative inflow (1) or the relative outflow of the level (2) are 
the dependent variables. Furthermore, while estimating the relative inflow in a level, we 
control for the outflow at this level in the period before. Finally, year dummies are included.  
Econometrically, we will estimate the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables on this panel data set by means of random effects and fixed effects models. The 
reason for using both methods is the different questions that can be answered from the 
individual analyses. The random effects model allows us to include certain observable firm-
specific characteristics that do not vary over time (such as type of industry). The fixed 
effects model does not allow for this extra scrutiny but controls for unobserved firm-specific 
differences. Thus, the fixed effects model provides information on the differences over 
years within a firm, while the random effects model also helps in finding the determinants 
of differences between firms. Since the main focus of this study is to find characteristics 
that differ between firms, the random effects model is predominant in our analyses. 
We will separately investigate the determinants of CEO departure and succession. 
Unfortunately, data on the reason for the departure of executives are not available, and 
thus a split between forced and unforced turnover cannot be made. The data do, however, 
give us a good opportunity to investigate whether the CEO is replaced from within the 
organization (insider) or from the outside. We classify the CEO as being an insider if 
he/she has worked for the organization in the previous two years before being appointed 
CEO. For analyzing the CEO turnover and replacement, a logit model is used, since the 
dependent variable is an ordinal variable. Additional independent variables in the CEO-
regressions are the age, education, and gender of the incumbent CEO.  
 
5.3.3 Sample 
The sample was constructed based on the availability of the different data items.  
Our preference for using data on financial performance has led to the decision to exclude 
                                                          
87 Organizations growing by more than a factor of 3 in a single year or shrinking by a factor of 3 or higher have been 
excluded. The variable “growth” can therefore take values between 0.33 and 3, with 1 denoting no change in growth 
(i.e. size is 100 percent of the year before).  
88 The exclusion of outliers (i.e. companies with exceptional levels of ROA or growth) leads to the omission of less 
than 1 percent of the total number of observations. 
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public sector organizations. Since no accounting data were available for financial service 
companies, this industry has been excluded as well. The period we study is 1992-1997, 
since these were the only years for which accounting data were available in the database. 
A total sample of 10,224 firms was reduced to 7,389 firms by selecting only those firms that 
employ at least 50 employees, in order to ensure that we can distinguish various job levels 
within an organization. Furthermore, we also exclude companies with less than 5 
employees in one of the three job levels. Also, in order to control for outliers, ROA that is 
above 100 percent or below –100 percent are excluded, as well as companies that grow or 
shrink by more than a factor of 3 in a year. All this selection leaves a sample of 1,465 
firms.89 
Tables A5.1 and A5.2 in Appendix A5 show an overview of the sample and the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent variables used (Table A5.2). Table A5.1 presents an overview 
of the sample that consists of between 731 and 851 firms, depending on the year.  
Most firms are quite small: roughly 80 percent of the sample companies have fewer than 
250 employees. Table A5.1 also shows that over 50 percent of the firms are operating in 
the manufacturing industry. 
 
5.4  Results 
In this section we present the results. First, we focus on the four potential determinants. 
After analyzing their effect on ports of exit and entry, we focus on the specific case of CEO 
turnover. Finally, we investigate what portion of the overall variation in the usage of ports of 
entry and exit is explained by firm characteristics (i.e. the four determinants). 
 
5.4.1 Determinants of ports of entry and exit 
Our first estimates focus on ports of exit and exit rates, since the number of employees 
leaving a firm is a potential determinant of the number of new job openings.  
These analyses concentrate on both total turnover and turnover at different levels of the 
organization. Table A5.3 in Appendix A5 presents the estimates of the turnover rate per 
firm as a whole, i.e. the percentage of workers leaving, without differentiating between 
levels, while Table A5.4 presents the regression results for top- and middle-management 
turnover relative to total turnover. The dependent variable of Table A5.4, relative turnover 
at level X, was explained earlier in Equation 5.1. These estimations show differences in 
turnover rates between levels. An additional control variable in these estimations is the 
relative size of the level for which the turnover rates are estimated.90 The dependent 
variable used in Table A5.5, relative wage of employees leaving at level X, was explained 
in Equation 5.3. These estimations provide insights on where employees leave an 
organization within a level. 
                                                          
89 Since we wish to control for a survivorship bias, we decided against creating a balanced sample. Thus, for some 
companies data is available for all 6 years, while other firms are only included in our sample for a spell of 2 years. 
90 We also estimated the turnover rates for each level, where we immediately controlled for the size of the level in the 
calculation of the dependent variable rather than using this additional control variable. For example, we estimated the 






Leaving Employees All Percentage1
X Level Leaving Employees Percentage 1log as the dependent 
variable. The results proved to be robust and similar to the results presented in Table A5.4. 
   




Relative Turnover Relative Wage Level Outflow Relative Inflow Relative Wage Level Inflow 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI 












































  RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
Profitability                       
 ROA – – – –     –        – – – –   
Size                       
 Log(employees)  +  –     –    –          
Growth                       
 Growth (%) – –   –    –    – – – – –    + + 
 Growth ^ 2 + +       +  +  + + + + +    – – 
Industry                       
 Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco –  +  +    +      +        
 Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather –    +  –    –  +  +      –  
 Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. –  +  +      –  +  +    –  –  
 Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. –  +  +      –    +        
 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products –  +  +        +          
 Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. –  +  +    +    +  +        
 Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. –  +  +        +  +      –  
 Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. –        +  –      –    –  
 Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles –  +  +      –    +  –    –  
 Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles –  +  +          +  –      
 Hotels and restaurants   +  +    +              
 Transport –  +  +      –    +  –    –  
 Letting and sale of real estate                       
 Business activities, etc.   +  +  –      +  +        
 Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc.   +  +        +          
 Legend of results:  +: Coefficient is estimated to be significantly positive (at least at 10% level). 
   –: Coefficient is estimated to be significantly negative (at least at 10% level). 
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Similar to the ports of exit, Tables A5.6 and A5.7 present the estimations of differences in 
inflow rates between levels (see Equation 5.2) and differences within levels (see Equation 
5.4).91 Because of the great number of tables we present a summary of all the results in 
Table 5.2. This table concentrates on the variables of interest (the four determinants) and 
gives an overview of the results of both the random effects estimations (RE) and the fixed 
effects estimations (FE). 
5.4.1.1 Profitability 
The first column (I) of Table 5.2 refers to Table A5.3 in Appendix A5 and investigates the 
number of employees leaving the organization (relative to the size of the organization).  
As can be seen from the results of both the fixed effects and the random effects 
estimations, the profitability rate in a year (ROA, see Equation 5.5) has a significantly 
negative relationship with the level of turnover of the entire organization. This indicates that 
companies with a relatively low profitability have higher turnover rates (random effects 
model) and also that companies with a low profitability in a certain year (i.e. below their 
average profitability level) have a higher turnover rate (fixed effects model). When looking 
at turnover rates per level, the results show a significantly negative relationship of ROA 
with top-management turnover. Whereas we first concluded that poor financial 
performance and higher turnover are related for the entire organization, this result is more 
distinct at the top-management level relative to the rest of the organization. We do not find 
the same effect of financial performance on the turnover rate of middle-managers in 
column III (refers to Table A5.4b).92  
Next, we analyze the ports of exit within the three different levels (see the results in 
columns IV-VI). Here, we only find a significant relationship for profitability when 
investigating the middle-management. Low profitability is related to separation of those 
middle-managers who have a high wage level. Overall, profitability seems to have a 
distinct relationship with ports of exit: low profitability and high turnover are related in 
general, but a relationship also exists with relative high turnover of top-managers and of 
highly paid middle-managers. This might be explained by two phenomena. First of all, 
poorly performing managers are likely to be fired when their performance is low.  
Secondly, better performing managers potentially voluntarily leave the organization and 
explore the external labor market to find an organization that offers more career 
opportunities.  
Our analyses indicate further that profitability has no relationship with the level at which 
employees enter a company, as can be seen in columns VII and VIII. Whereas we 
previously found that a lower profitability is connected to relatively high top-management 
turnover rates, we do not find evidence that managers are more likely to be replaced by 
outsiders (relative to hiring outsiders at other levels). The results show that profitability has 
a negative effect on the entrant’s relative wage levels for both the top- and the middle-
management of the organization. This implies that highly profitable companies have 
managers entering at relatively low wage levels, whereas companies with a low profitability 
hire managers at a relatively high wage position. Possible explanations are that 
experienced managers are hired to restructure the company, and that managers require a 
                                                          
91 We do not present the inflow rates for the complete organization, since estimating this variable is mainly 
determined by the growth rate of the company, and the results do not provide additional insights on ports of entry. 
92 We do not present the analyses for the lower-level workers. Naturally, this group would show the direct opposite 
results since the dependent variables correct for the turnover of the entire organization. Thus, where we find that 
poor financial results lead to higher turnover rates at the top-management level and have no effect on the middle-
management, the estimations for the low-level workers show that good financial results lead to higher turnover rates 
at the lower-level of organizations.  
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type of risk premium for the hazard of working at a less profitable company.93 Thus, we 
conclude that ports of entry, when looking within a level, are also related to the profitability 
level of the firm. 
5.4.1.2 Size 
The next determinant is the size of the company. When looking at ports of exit, the 
estimations in the two models (random effects and fixed effects) lead to different results. 
The number of employees has no significant effect on turnover rate in the random effects 
model, whereas the effect is significantly positive for the fixed effects model. This result 
implies that turnover rate is higher if a firm is larger in a specific year than its average size 
over the years, which is an expected outcome of the fixed effects technique.  
More noteworthy, when looking at the different levels, the results show that the size of the 
company has a negative effect on turnover at the higher management level. Within larger 
organizations turnover rates appear to be higher at the lower-levels relative to the top-
management in the fixed effects model. Apparently, organizations that are larger in a 
certain year than their average size return to their normal standard by down-sizing more 
fiercely in the lower and middle ranks than in the top-management. Overall, firm size is not 
a determinant that helps understand differences in ports of exit between firms. The fixed 
effects models, studying within firm variation, show that the size of a company helps to 
explain in what way companies return to their theoretical mean size in the sample period. 
Regarding ports of entry, we find a noteworthy significant relationship between the size of 
the company and at what position the employees enter a company. Transecting the 
organization into three levels, we find that larger firms have significantly less inflow at the 
top level relative to inflow at other levels. Thus, comparing between firms, larger firms tend 
to make less use of the top-management level as a port of entry and prefer homegrown 
management. A possible explanation is that larger firms have a larger reserve of potential 
top-managers. Alternatively, larger firms can have the critical mass to provide training 
opportunities for prospective managers, which enables them to slowly develop into a new 
role, which is potentially less or absent for small firms. 
5.4.1.3 Growth 
Concerning the firm’s growth rate, measured by the change in the number of employees, 
both the random effects and the fixed effects model indicate that firms with higher growth 
rates have lower turnover rates, as can be expected. Hence, firms that grow faster than 
their competitors have lower turnover rates (random effects model), and firms that grow 
faster in a specific year than their average growth rate over the period analyzed also have 
lower turnover rates (see the results in column II of Table 5.2). Furthermore, when looking 
at relative turnover, the results show that a company’s growth rate has, if anything, a 
negative relationship with exit rates at the middle-management level. The determinant 
‘growth’ also is connected to the wage level at which workers exit an organization at the 
middle-management level (results in column V). Thus, employees who leave an 
organization at the middle-management level in a high growth situation are those 
employees with a lower wage level: for example, employees who miss out on the internal 
career opportunities. In two instances (i.e. turnover at the entire organization and relative 
wage level of employees leaving the middle-management), the estimations indicate that 
the negative effect of growth on turnover is somewhat overridden by the significant positive 
effect of the quadratic term. The positive coefficient for growth squared combined with the 
                                                          
93 Theoretically, an alternative explanation would be that poor financial conditions have lowered the wages of the 
incumbent workers, leading to similar outcomes. In practice, nominal wage decreases are exceptional (see the 
results in Table 2.4 and Chapter 4), and thus this explanation is improbable.  
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negative coefficient for growth indicates a concave function (U-shaped). Since the growth 
variable can take values between 0.33 and 3, this leaves the minimum of the function 
within the distribution of potential values. In fact, in these two cases the estimated 
minimum is larger than 1 (1.6 for top-management and 1.3 for middle-management), 
indicating that only high growth (larger than 60 percent or 30 percent growth in a single 
year) is beyond the minimum. Up until the minimum, growth has a significant negative 
relationship with turnover rates. A possible explanation is that a merger or acquisition is the 
reason for the large growth (i.e. larger than 30, 60 percent) and the post merger integration 
causes turnover in these higher ranks. 
All equations relating to entry show that high growth firms have less inflow at the top- and 
middle-management level than low growth firms. Again, the results show a concave 
function, with the minimum being larger than 1.7 (i.e. more than 70 percent growth in a 
single year) in both cases. Furthermore, the results show that growth has a negative 
relationship with the relative wage level of newly-entering top-managers, both relative to 
other companies (random effects model) and relative to other years (fixed effects model). 
The estimates indicate that high growth companies attract managers at a lower wage level, 
which leaves them with the opportunity to obtain wage increases within the organization. 
For example, young and less experienced workers, who can develop themselves within the 
organization in the future, are attracted at lower-levels, while incumbents are already 
following this internal career track and fulfilling job openings at higher wage levels. Again, 
the growth-squared variable has a tendency to reduce the result, the minimum being at 1.5 
(i.e. 50 percent growth). In contrast, high growth firms attract relatively high-paid 
employees at the lower-level (see column XI). Apparently, high growth firms have a 
requirement to hire lower-level employees with high capabilities. 
5.4.1.4 Industry 
The fourth determinant of ports of entry and exit is industry. The effect of industry on ports 
of entry and exit can only be established through the random effects model. The estimates 
of the turnover rate of the company shows that, compared with the construction industry 
(the reference industry), turnover is significantly lower in most of the other industry groups 
(e.g. manufacturing). Looking inside the company, the results show that turnover is 
relatively high at the top of the organization within the manufacturing industry, but also at 
the top in retail, hotels and restaurants, transport and other business activities. This result 
is persistently found for the top-management level of a company (see column II, 
corresponding with Table A5.4a in Appendix A5) and holds also for the middle-
management. Combining this with the previously found result (i.e. a lower total turnover 
rate in the manufacturing industry) leads to the conclusion that the construction industry, 
the benchmark, has a higher turnover rate, in particular for blue-collar workers.  
This possibly indicates that within the construction industry the flow between blue-collar 
and white-collar workers is relatively low, leading to increased turnover for blue-collar 
workers. Industry does not have a large impact on the ports of exit within a level (columns 
IV-VI). 
Regarding ports of entry, the results (see columns VII and VIII) show that some sectors 
within the manufacturing industry hire relatively more employees at the professional and 
top-management levels of the organization than the benchmark industry. This indicates 
that in the manufacturing industry fewer blue-collar workers advance to the middle- and 
top-management. Apparently, different skills are required since more employees need to 
be hired from the outside to fill higher positions. Regarding the influence of the industry, the 
results show that in the wholesale, retail and transportation industries top-managers are 
hired at lower wage levels (relative to the incumbents) than in other industries.  
These results do not hold for the middle-management level. 
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5.4.2 CEO turnover 
The position of the CEO is a specific port of entry and exit, since the current firm offers no 
promotion opportunities for the incumbent CEO. More generally, according to the 
tournament model, the incentive effect of a promotion for board members depends on the 
chance that the position of CEO becomes vacant. We include a test for CEO turnover to 
illustrate (1) the commonalities in approach (technique) between CEO turnover literature 
and personnel economics and (2) the similarities in outcomes. The left-hand side of Table 
5.3 presents the results of the panel regression that uses a dummy for CEO turnover in the 
next year as the dependent variable. It shows that there is no significant relationship 
between profitability and the likelihood that the CEO will be replaced, unlike the results 
concerning top-management turnover shown in Table A5.4a of Appendix A5 (see Section 
5.4.1.1). A likely explanation is the high number of family-owned firms in Denmark, where 
the owner also fulfills the role of CEO. Unfortunately, the data do not permit the 
identification of family ownership. 
The right-hand side of Table 5.3 presents the results regarding the succession of the CEO. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the new CEO comes 
from the inside, which is the case in 76 percent of CEO successions in the sample. A lower 
profitability rate in the year previous to the departure of the incumbent CEO increases the 
chance that the new CEO will be hired from the outside rather than from within, consistent 
with existing CEO-turnover literature. This might be due to the need for poorly performing 
companies to attract an outsider who can turn around the financial situation (see Huson et 
al., 2004). The result is in line with the previous observation that poor performance will 
increase the wage level of newly hired top-managers (see Section 5.4.1.1), since this 
newly hired manager can in fact be the new CEO. The other determinants (size, growth 
rate, and industry) have no significant effect on the succession decision.94 
 
5.4.3 Variance explained 
The previous section showed in which cases the proposed determinants of entry and exit 
at various hierarchical levels were significant. But what percentage of the total variance 
across firms in the usage of ports of entry and exit is explained by the four factors (size, 
growth rate, industry and profitability)? The answer to this question, i.e. knowledge of the 
explanatory power of the determinants, is important to better understand the impact of the 
four determinants on ports of entry and exit. 
 
                                                          
94 In these estimations, we include four industry dummies, which is an aggregate of the previous set of industry 
dummies (due to sample size). None of these dummies are estimated to have a significant relationship in either of 
the two specifications of Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: CEO-turnover and succession 
 CEO Change Next Year95
(RE Model) 
Replaced by Insider96 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.151  (0.809)    
ROA prev. year (t-1)   4.209** (2.046) 
Log(employees) 0.013  (0.113) 0.211  (0.277) 
Growth (%) 0.094  (2.749) 7.612  (4.790) 
Growth ^ 2 -0.435  (1.230) -4.043* (2.110) 
Age incumbent 0.006  (0.010) 0.006  (0.020) 
Education incumbent 0.032  (0.037) -0.07  (0.097) 
Gender incumbent -1.140*** (0.375) 1.086  (0.696) 
Avg. top size 1.961* (1.057) -0.032  (2.008) 
Constant -2.505  (4.883) -4.104  (3.531) 
        
Industry dummies Yes Yes   
Year dummies Yes Yes   
Age dummies Yes    
Education Yes    
Gender Yes    
     
R2  0.158   
     
N (Groups) 499    
N (Observations) 1861   239    
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
 
In order to answer this question, all random effects regressions are estimated again, while 
excluding the proposed determinants and including the control variables. Table 5.4 shows 
the R2 of all regressions for the two distinct situations and also the F-test for the 
determinants. The results of the different F-tests show that the determinants contribute 
significantly to the explanation of the variance in the dependent variables; the contribution 
is significant at the 1 percent level in all cases (but one). The last column shows that the 
variance explained by the determinants varies between 0.8 and 8.3 percent. Although this 
seems small, the variance explained by the control variables is low in some cases as well 
(especially while estimating the relative wage levels), making the relative contribution of 
these additional determinants quite large (see the last column with relative difference in 
R2). Nonetheless, much variance remains unexplained, indicating that further research is 
needed.97  
                                                          
95 The fixed effects model showed similar results with also no significant effect of ROA on CEO-turnover. Splitting the 
sample into groups based on the size of the companies did not change the outcomes of the regression. 
96 Variable takes the value of 1 if the new CEO is an insider. 
97 R2 are commonly small in cross-section analyses (see also Eriksson and Werwatz, 2003). 
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Table 5.4: Variance explained by the determinants  
F-Test Overall R2 Difference in R2 Dependent Variable Level Table 





Turn-over Rate Entire org. A5.3 0.000 0.202 0.119 10% 8.3% 
Relative Turnover Top-man. A5.4a 0.000 0.299 0.283 6% 1.6% 
  Middle-man. A5.4b 0.000 0.486 0.472 3% 1.4% 
Relative Wage Level  Top-man. A5.5a 0.022 0.038 0.023 65% 1.5% 
Outflow Middle-man. A5.5b 0.001 0.034 0.017 100% 1.7% 
  Lower-level A5.5c 0.000 0.069 0.054 28% 1.5% 
Relative Inflow Top-man. A5.6a 0.000 0.317 0.304 4% 1.3% 
  Middle-man. A5.6b 0.000 0.470 0.462 2% 0.8% 
Relative Wage Level  Top-man. A5.7a 0.000 0.065 0.047 38% 1.8% 
Inflow Middle-man. A5.7b 0.005 0.025 0.008 213% 1.7% 
  Lower-level A5.7c 0.000 0.135 0.107 26% 2.8% 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the variation in stylized facts of ILMs along four firm 
characteristics. More specifically, we analyzed the impact of the size of the organization, its 
growth rate, the type of industry, and the financial performance, on employee turnover and 
ports of entry and exit. Our results show that these factors affect the usage of ports of entry 
and exit significantly and should be taken into account while reviewing single-firm 
analyses. 
Financial performance affects ports of entry and exit in two ways. First of all, poor 
performance is related with higher employee turnover rates at all levels in the organization. 
Poor performance specifically influences the outflow at the top-management level, 
although the CEO-level is an exception. Possible explanations are that companies wish to 
dismiss unsuccessful managers and appoint new managers with the ability to restructure 
the organizations in case of poor company results. A different explanation is that 
employees leave companies with poor profitability voluntarily to find work elsewhere. 
Second, poor performance will generate a tendency to hire new top- and middle-managers 
at a higher wage level. Two possible explanations for this finding are that (1) better and 
more experienced managers are required, and (2) new managers have to be compensated 
for the extra risk entailed by entering a company in financial distress. In line with this result 
and the existing CEO-turnover literature, we find that outsiders rather than managers from 
within are succeeding the CEO in situations of poorer financial performance.  
The size of a company has only limited impact on ports of exit. We find limited evidence 
that within firm variation in size explains turnover rates: organizations, when downsizing in 
a year in which they are relatively large in size, have a tendency to downsize less heavily 
at the top-management level. Potentially, top-management positions are less suitable to be 
made vacant when downsizing. Regarding ports of entry, we did find that larger 
organizations have relatively less inflow at the top layer.  
The growth rate of a company has a relationship with the position where workers enter an 
organization. Fast-growing companies show a preference to hire outside employees at 
lower positions rather than at the top. Once new managers enter fast-growing 
organizations, they enter at a relatively low position compared with slower growing (or 
shrinking) organizations. Overall, larger and faster growing organizations provide more 
evidence of distinct ports of entry at lower-levels. 
The impact of industry effects on ports of entry and exit is more difficult to generalize. We 
found some evidence that manufacturing companies have more exit and entry at the white-
  
Chapter 5  98 
collar levels, relative to the construction industry. This indicates that within manufacturing 
companies less exchange occurs across blue-collar and white-collar employees, 
presumably caused by larger differences in the required human capital. Unfortunately, 
financial services companies were not included in the analyses, and therefore we were 
unable to locate the strong industry effects that Eriksson and Werwatz (2003) found. 
Our findings have implications for the interpretation of previous empirical research. 
Comparing the results with the characteristics of firms that were used for single-firm 
analyses in Table 5.1, we conclude that indeed most support for distinct ports of entry has 
been found in situations of large, growing, profitable companies (e.g. Howlett, 2001; 
Seltzer and Merrett, 2000). Indeed, Dohmen et al. (2004) and Hamilton and MacKinnon 
(2001) found no evidence of distinct ports of entry while investigating a slightly shrinking 
firm in financial distress, which is consistent with our findings. This indicates that the 
question "Do specific ports of entry (and exit) exist?" can not be answered univocally and 
in fact challenges the generalization of ILMs. 
A closer examination of the variance explained by the four determinants shows that they 
do indeed contribute significantly to our understanding of ports of entry and exit, although 
much variance remains undetermined. This indicates a need for further research, 
potentially in two ways. First of all, the results show that other potential determinants 
should be included as well: for example, the corporate culture and the skills of incumbent 
employees. Much variance between organizations in the usage of distinct ports of entry 
and exit exists, which is shown not only by the results in this study, but also in Table 5.1 
and in the study by Lazear and Oyer (2004). Finding other determinants will surely benefit 
the research in personnel economics, since ports of entry and exit are among the 
fundamentals of ILMs. 
Second, the proxies for ports of entry and exit used in this study include much noise. It was 
only possible for us to distinguish between three job levels, which could be improved in 
future work. For example, in this study we were unable to create extensive within-firm job 
ladders. Some firms could have a vast majority of blue-collar workers, while other firms (in 
a different industry) consist of a large quantity of white-collar workers. These differences 
are likely to impact our results. More detailed job descriptions will lead to a better 
distinction between job levels and might increase the total variance explained. 
This touches upon a major difficulty with taking a multi-firm approach, which is to correctly 
define jobs and thus job levels (e.g. Baker and Holmstrom, 1995) that are valid for firms in 
different industries. While case studies are able to explore the inside of organizations in 
such a way that more specific questions regarding ILMs can be answered, it would be 
impossible to study the same level of detail for a large number of companies 
simultaneously. Focusing on just two attributes: namely, ports of entry and exit, this study 
leads to more general conclusions regarding the impact of firm characteristics on the ILM, 
which is novel in itself. By doing so, we show that the factors discussed should be taken 
into account when assessing the general validity of conclusions resulting from analyses 
into aspects of internal labor markets by means of single-firm studies. Promising empirical 
investigations can be expected from future multi-firm analyses. 
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Appendix A5 
 
Table A5.1: Sample statistics 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
              
Sample size   779 731 810 804 799 851  
   
Size 50-249 84.2% 82.6% 81.2% 81.5% 78.8% 79.6%  
  250-499 10.8% 11.8% 13.2% 13.3% 14.6% 14.6%  
  500-749 2.2% 3.4% 3.6% 2.4% 3.3% 2.9%  
  750-999 1.9% 1.2% 0.9% 1.7% 1.1% 1.1%  
  >1000 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 2.1% 1.9%  
   
Growth rate < - 2.5% 32.5% 36.1% 16.7% 19.3% 26.7% 21.2%  
  - 2.5% / 0% 16.9% 17.6% 16.0% 14.4% 13.4% 13.0%  
 0% / 2.5% 17.6% 18.1% 16.7% 21.0% 23.4% 21.9%  
 2.5% / 5% 11.4% 10.0% 14.0% 13.6% 12.9% 14.3%  
 > 5% 21.6% 18.2% 36.7% 31.7% 23.7% 29.6%  
   
Industry 
Manuf. of food, beverages 
and tobacco 
6.3% 6.7% 6.2% 6.0% 5.9% 6.1%  
 
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, 
leather 
3.2% 2.7% 2.6% 3.0% 3.0% 2.2%  
 
Manuf. of wood products, 
printing and publ. 
6.4% 7.0% 6.9% 6.8% 7.8% 7.9%  
 
Manuf. of chemicals, 
plastic products, etc. 
7.5% 6.9% 7.5% 7.9% 6.6% 6.3%  
 
Manuf. of other non-
metallic mineral products 
1.7% 1.9% 2.4% 2.1% 2.0% 2.6%  
 
Manuf. of basic metals and 
fabr. metal prod. 
31.0% 30.0% 31.1% 30.2% 30.4% 30.1%  
 
Manuf. of furniture; 
manufacturing n.e.s. 
2.9% 2.1% 2.1% 2.4% 3.3% 2.6%  
 Construction 5.9% 5.8% 4.1% 5.3% 5.1% 4.6%  
 
Sale and repair of motor 
vehicles, etc. 
4.1% 3.4% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.8%  
 
Ws. and commis. trade, 
excl. m. vehicles98 
18.3% 19.2% 18.8% 19.0% 19.8% 19.5%  
 
Re. trade and repair work 
excl. m. vehicles99 
4.6% 4.9% 4.8% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0%  
 Hotels and restaurants 0.8% 1.1% 1.5% 1.0% 0.8% 0.7%  
 Transport 3.3% 3.8% 3.3% 3.9% 3.4% 3.4%  
 
Letting and sale of real 
estate 
0.5% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8%  
 Business activities, etc. 3.2% 3.6% 4.6% 4.1% 3.5% 4.8%  
 
Ref. disposal, organiz., 
entertainment, etc. 
0.7% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%  
 
                                                          
98 Ws refers to wholesale. 
99 Re refers to retail. 
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Table A5.2: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev 
Dependent variables  
  Turn-over Rate (Entire org.) 0.211 (0.137) 
  Relative Turnover (Top-man.) 0.112 (0.109) 
  Relative Turnover (Middle-man.) 0.163 (0.154) 
  Relative Wage Level Outflow (Top-man.) -0.107 (0.429) 
  Relative Wage Level Outflow (Middle-man.) -0.028 (0.316) 
  Relative Wage Level Outflow (Lower-level) -0.064 (0.208) 
  Relative Inflow (Top-Man.) 0.118 (0.114) 
  Relative Inflow (Middle-man.) 0.155 (0.149) 
  Relative Wage Level Inflow (Top-man.) -0.287 (0.434) 
  Relative Wage Level Inflow (Middle-man.) -0.135 (0.327) 
  Relative Wage Level Inflow (Lower-level) -0.129 (0.249) 
 CEO Change Next Year 0.104 (0.305) 
 Replaced by Insider 0.758 (0.429) 
Selection of independent variables  
  ROA 0.084 (0.110) 
  Log (Employees) 4.933 (0.698) 
  Growth rate 1.048 (0.221) 
 
   
101  Pay, Promotions, and Performance 
Table A5.3: Turnover rates for total organization 




 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.155*** (0.017) -0.100*** (0.019) 
Log(employees) 0.007  (0.004) 0.060*** (0.011) 
Growth (%) -0.134*** (0.033) -0.093*** (0.036) 
Growth ^ 2 0.049*** (0.012) 0.030** (0.013) 
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco -0.054*** (0.018)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather -0.071*** (0.022)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. -0.061*** (0.016)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. -0.078*** (0.017)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products -0.059** (0.024)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. -0.086*** (0.013)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. -0.087*** (0.021)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. -0.108*** (0.020)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles -0.059*** (0.014)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles -0.046** (0.021)   
Hotels and restaurants -0.009  (0.032)   
Transport -0.055*** (0.020)   
Letting and sale of real estate -0.004  (0.036)   
Business activities, etc. 0.022  (0.020)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. -0.033  (0.047)   
Constant 0.495*** (0.125) 0.413* (0.198) 
     
Age dummies Yes  Yes  
Education Yes  Yes  
Gender Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes    Yes    
     
R2 within 0.060  0.085  
R2 between 0.215  0.001  
R2 overall 0.202  0.002  
     
N: Groups 1465  1465  
N: Observations 4758  4758  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
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 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.044*** (0.013) -0.054*** (0.018) 
Log(employees) -0.003  (0.002) -0.028*** (0.010) 
Growth (%) -0.039 (0.028) -0.033  (0.033) 
Growth ^ 2 0.012 (0.010) 0.010  (0.012) 
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.017* (0.010)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather 0.005  (0.012)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.041*** (0.009)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.023** (0.009)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.049*** (0.013)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.017** (0.007)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. 0.051*** (0.012)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. -0.003  (0.011)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles 0.008  (0.008)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.023* (0.012)   
Hotels and restaurants 0.053*** (0.019)   
Transport 0.020* (0.011)   
Letting and sale of real estate 0.016  (0.021)   
Business activities, etc. 0.046*** (0.011)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.116*** (0.027)   
Constant -0.171** (0.085) -0.237  (0.182) 
     
Age dummies Yes  Yes  
Education  Yes  Yes  
Gender  Yes  Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes    Yes    
     
R2 within 0.006  0.034  
R2 between 0.441  0.061  
R2 overall 0.299  0.070   
     
N: Groups 1460  1460  
N: Observations 4745  4745  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
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Table A5.4b: Relative turnover of middle-management 
 






 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.003  (0.016) -0.004  (0.022) 
Log(employees) -0.003  (0.003) 0.001  (0.012) 
Growth (%) -0.056* (0.034) -0.048  (0.041) 
Growth ^ 2 0.018  (0.013) 0.018  (0.015) 
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.039*** (0.012)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather 0.051*** (0.015)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.035*** (0.011)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.046*** (0.011)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.041*** (0.016)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.033*** (0.009)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. 0.037** (0.014)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. 0.010  (0.013)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles 0.071*** (0.010)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.050*** (0.014)   
Hotels and restaurants 0.063*** (0.023)   
Transport 0.093*** (0.014)   
Letting and sale of real estate 0.019  (0.025)   
Business activities, etc. 0.064*** (0.013)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.075** (0.033)   
Constant -0.249** (0.104) -0.268  (0.225) 
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.076 0.085  
R2 between 0.632 0.443   
R2 overall 0.486 0.356   
    
N: Groups 1460 1460  
N: Observations 4745 4745  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
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Table A5.5a: Relative wage of outflow in top-management 
 
Log(rel. wage outflow 
top-management) 
(RE model) 
Log(rel. wage outflow 
top-management) 
(FE model) 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.087  (0.071) -0.032  (0.104)  
Log(employees) -0.001  (0.013) -0.011  (0.059)  
Growth (%) -0.070  (0.159) -0.070  (0.202)  
Growth ^ 2 0.029  (0.061) 0.026  (0.075)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco -0.009  (0.056)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather -0.160** (0.073)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.007  (0.053)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.002  (0.054)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.040  (0.077)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.046  (0.043)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. -0.067  (0.070)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. 0.049  (0.066)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles -0.017  (0.047)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.042  (0.068)   
Hotels and restaurants -0.035  (0.104)   
Transport -0.095  (0.064)   
Letting and sale of real estate 0.010  (0.123)   
Business activities, etc. -0.127** (0.062)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. -0.240  (0.172)   
Constant -0.576  (0.503) 0.319  (1.082)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.006 0.014  
R2 between 0.050 0.000  
R2 overall 0.038 0.000  
    
N: Groups 1227 1227  
N: Observations 3219 3219  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
 
 
   
105  Pay, Promotions, and Performance 
Table A5.5b: Relative wage of outflow in middle-management 
 
Log(rel. wage outflow 
middle-management) 
(RE model) 
Log(rel. wage outflow 
middle-management) 
(FE model) 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.112** (0.050) -0.086  (0.070)  
Log(employees) -0.016* (0.009) 0.036  (0.041)  
Growth (%) -0.207* (0.113) -0.206  (0.137)  
Growth ^ 2 0.078*  (0.043) 0.064  (0.050)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.116*** (0.041)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather 0.016  (0.052)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.008  (0.039)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.064  (0.039)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.079  (0.055)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.061* (0.032)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. 0.013  (0.053)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. 0.107** (0.047)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles 0.022  (0.035)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.041  (0.049)   
Hotels and restaurants 0.170** (0.082)   
Transport -0.033  (0.046)   
Letting and sale of real estate -0.068  (0.083)   
Business activities, etc. 0.025  (0.046)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. -0.140  (0.118)   
Constant -0.296  (0.351) 0.665  (0.762)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.005 0.011  
R2 between 0.051 0.002  
R2 overall 0.034 0.001  
    
N: Groups 1294 1294  
N: Observations 3669 3669  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
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Table A5.5c: Relative wage of outflow in lower-levels 
 
Log(rel. wage outflow 
lower-levels) 
(RE model) 
Log(rel. wage outflow 
lower-levels) 
(FE model) 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.026  (0.029) -0.004  (0.040)  
Log(employees) 0.009  (0.006) 0.010  (0.023)  
Growth (%) -0.085  (0.063) -0.044  (0.075)  
Growth ^ 2 0.039* (0.023) 0.024  (0.027)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco -0.034  (0.023)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather -0.080*** (0.029)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. -0.073*** (0.021)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. -0.036* (0.022)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products -0.032  (0.031)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. -0.019  (0.017)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. -0.039  (0.028)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. -0.082*** (0.025)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles -0.042** (0.019)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.018  (0.027)   
Hotels and restaurants -0.065  (0.043)   
Transport -0.058** (0.026)   
Letting and sale of real estate 0.020  (0.050)   
Business activities, etc. -0.043  (0.026)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. -0.049  (0.067)   
Constant -0.006  (0.200) -0.359  (0.410)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.003 0.013  
R2 between 0.110 0.000  
R2 overall 0.069 0.000  
    
N: Groups 1440 1440  
N: Observations 4657 4657  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
 
   
107  Pay, Promotions, and Performance 
 








 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.011  (0.014) 0.002  (0.019)  
Log(employees) -0.006** (0.003) -0.015  (0.011)  
Growth (%) -0.136*** (0.034) -0.105** (0.042)  
Growth ^ 2 0.040*** (0.012) 0.031** (0.014)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.009  (0.011)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather 0.025* (0.013)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.042** (0.010)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.016 (0.010)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.034** (0.014)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.019** (0.008)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. 0.031** (0.013)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. 0.006  (0.012)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles 0.007  (0.009)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.008  (0.013)   
Hotels and restaurants 0.024  (0.020)   
Transport 0.012  (0.012)   
Letting and sale of real estate -0.004  (0.022)   
Business activities, etc. 0.046*** (0.012)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.094*** (0.029)   
Constant -0.008  (0.093) -0.462** (0.196)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Relative outflow at this level t-1 Yes Yes  
Turnover rate t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.032 0.063  
R2 between 0.441 0.174  
R2 overall 0.317 0.152  
    
N: Groups 1456 1456  
N: Observations 4724 4724  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
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 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA 0.003  (0.015) 0.004  (0.022)  
Log(employees) -0.002  (0.003) 0.003  (0.013)  
Growth (%) -0.140*** (0.039) -0.118** (0.048)  
Growth ^ 2 0.040*** (0.014) 0.033** (0.016)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.029** (0.011)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather 0.058*** (0.015)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. 0.025** (0.011)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.029*** (0.011)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.009 (0.015)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.017** (0.009)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. 0.038*** (0.014)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. 0.004  (0.013)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles 0.042*** (0.010)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.039*** (0.014)   
Hotels and restaurants 0.034  (0.022)   
Transport 0.044*** (0.013)   
Letting and sale of real estate 0.027  (0.024)   
Business activities, etc. 0.054*** (0.013)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.041  (0.032)   
Constant -0.136 (0.103) -0.641*** (0.224)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Relative outflow at this level t-1 Yes Yes  
Turnover rate t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.050 0.065  
R2 between 0.630 0.407  
R2 overall 0.470 0.322  
    
N: Groups 1456 1456  
N: Observations 4724 4724  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
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 Table A5.7a: Relative wage of inflow in top-management 
 
Log(rel. wage inflow top-
management) 
(RE model) 
Log(rel. wage inflow top-
management) 
(FE model) 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.173** (0.071) -0.197* (0.101)  
Log(employees) 0.011  (0.013) 0.043  (0.057)  
Growth (%) -0.422*** (0.153) -0.280 (0.188)  
Growth ^ 2 0.145** (0.056) 0.082 (0.067)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.027  (0.056)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather -0.006  (0.072)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. -0.036  (0.053)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. 0.006  (0.054)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.031  (0.075)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.007  (0.043)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. -0.012  (0.070)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. -0.157** (0.063)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles -0.098** (0.047)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles -0.133** (0.067)   
Hotels and restaurants -0.019  (0.108)   
Transport -0.130** (0.064)   
Letting and sale of real estate -0.135  (0.116)   
Business activities, etc. -0.069  (0.062)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.033  (0.144)   
Constant -0.981** (0.497) -0.289  (1.064)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.015 0.020  
R2 between 0.095 0.031  
R2 overall 0.065 0.027  
    
N: Groups 1295 1295  
N: Observations 3511 3511  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
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Table A5.7b: Relative wage of inflow in middle-management 
 
Log(rel. wage inflow 
middle-management) 
(RE model) 
Log(rel. wage inflow 
middle-management) 
(FE model) 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA -0.141*** (0.053) -0.177** (0.076)  
Log(employees) -0.012  (0.010) -0.011  (0.043)  
Growth (%) 0.094 (0.110) 0.155  (0.136)  
Growth ^ 2 -0.017  (0.040) -0.050  (0.048)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco 0.035  (0.042)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather -0.048  (0.055)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. -0.078* (0.040)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. -0.033  (0.041)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 0.021  (0.058)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. 0.005  (0.033)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. 0.037  (0.053)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. 0.003  (0.048)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles 0.007  (0.036)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles -0.080  (0.051)   
Hotels and restaurants -0.024  (0.083)   
Transport -0.049  (0.049)   
Letting and sale of real estate -0.021  (0.086)   
Business activities, etc. 0.056  (0.047)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.136  (0.118)   
Constant -0.106  (0.368) -0.971  (0.802)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.006 0.011  
R2 between 0.030 0.004  
R2 overall 0.025 0.006  
    
N: Groups 1309 1309  
N: Observations 3714 3714  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
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Table A5.7c: Relative wage of inflow in lower-levels 
 
Log(rel. wage inflow 
lower-levels) 
(RE model) 
Log(rel. wage inflow 
lower-levels) 
(FE model) 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ROA 0.034  (0.035) 0.016  (0.045)  
Log(employees) 0.005  (0.007) -0.043  (0.026)  
Growth (%) 0.316*** (0.070) 0.370*** (0.083)  
Growth ^ 2 -0.067*** (0.026) -0.088*** (0.030)  
Manuf. of food, beverages and tobacco -0.010  (0.027)   
Manuf. of textiles, clothing, leather -0.065* (0.034)   
Manuf. of wood products, printing and publ. -0.086*** (0.025)   
Manuf. of chemicals, plastic products, etc. -0.034  (0.026)   
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products -0.049  (0.037)   
Manuf. of basic metals and fabr. metal prod. -0.027  (0.021)   
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.s. -0.080** (0.033)   
Sale and repair of motor vehicles, etc. -0.122*** (0.030)   
Ws. and commis. trade, excl. m. vehicles -0.041* (0.023)   
Re. trade and repair work excl. m. vehicles 0.007  (0.032)   
Hotels and restaurants 0.071  (0.051)   
Transport -0.079** (0.032)   
Letting and sale of real estate -0.024  (0.058)   
Business activities, etc. -0.022  (0.032)   
Ref. disposal, organiz., entertainment, etc. 0.006  (0.074)   
Constant 0.058  (0.235) -0.287 (0.464)  
    
Age dummies Yes Yes  
Education  Yes Yes  
Gender  Yes Yes  
Rel. level size t-1 Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes   
    
R2 within 0.041 0.049  
R2 between 0.185 0.013  
R2 overall 0.135 0.018  
    
N: Groups 1432 1432  
N: Observations 4618 4618  
*p < .10, two-tailed tests.  
**p < .05, two-tailed tests.  
***p < .01, two-tailed tests.  
 
  
 
